Supreme Court, U.S.
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No.

In The Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

Chris E. Traxler,
Petitioner

v.

United States of America,
Respondent

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals

---

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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October 1994

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the charge pertaining to disobeying a lawful command to board an aircraft should have been dismissed, when the underlying offense of missing movement was also charged.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The petitioner, Chris E. Traxler, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the order and judgment of the United States Court of Military Appeals entered in his case on 14 July 1994.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order and judgment of the United States Court of Military Appeals, reported at 39 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1994), is located at Appendix A. The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Military Review, unpublished, ACM 29311 (A.F.C.M.R. 23 December 1992), is located at Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The final order of the United States Court of Military Appeals was entered on 14 July 1994. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1259(3) (Supp. 1993) and 10 U.S.C.A. § 867(a) (Supp. 1993).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article 90, U.C.M.J., Manual for Courts-martial (1984), paragraph 14c(2)(a)(iii), states in pertinent part, "[d]isobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article [disobeying a lawful command]."

Article 90, U.C.M.J., Manual for Courts-martial (1984), paragraph 14c(2)(d), states, in pertinent part, "[a]n exhortation to 'obey the law' or to perform one's military duty does not constitute an order under this article [disobeying a lawful command]."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner's commander, Captain John W. Collins, testified he notified the petitioner of an upcoming deployment on 12 December 1990. The petitioner indicated that he would not deploy with his unit. After hearing this, Captain Collins prepared a written order. He stated in a pretrial motion, that the purpose of the order was "to indicate to [the petitioner] the seriousness of the deployment and that if he actually refused to deploy that he needed to think twice about that thought." He also testified that punishment was not on his mind when he generated the order, because the petitioner had not yet done anything wrong. However, Captain Collins considered it a possibility that the petitioner would not deploy, and that is why he took the written order with him. Deploy-

ment was not part of the petitioner's routine duty. Captain Collins testified that his giving the written order to the petitioner was relatively simultaneous with his refusing to board the aircraft. He sought help from the legal office in preparing the written order, but no discussion of punishment took place.

The petitioner did not board the aircraft, and thus missed the aircraft's movement. As a result of this, the petitioner was court-martialed. Before trial, the defense counsel submitted a motion to dismiss the charge pertaining to disobeying a lawful command, since the underlying offense of missing movement was also charged. The trial judge denied this motion, although he did find that the two charges were multiplicious for sentencing purposes. Although the petitioner plead not guilty, a general court-martial with members then convicted the petitioner of missing movement of an aircraft through design and willfully disobeying the command of Captain Collins to board that same aircraft (Articles 87 and 90, U.C.M.J., respectively). The petitioner was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, confinement for one year, reduction to the grade of E-5, and a reprimand. The findings and sentence were approved by the convening authority.

The United States Air Force Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and the trial judge's denial of the defense motion to dismiss. The Court held that it was clear from the record of trial, that the order was issued by the petitioner's commander with a view to adding the full authority of his position to ensure compliance with the order, and that it was not given for the purpose of enhancing the punishment. The Court also agreed with the trial judge that the ultimate offense was the disobedience of the order from the petitioner's commander to board the aircraft. *United States v. Traxler*, unpublished, ACM 29311, at page 2 (A.F.C.M.R. 23 December 1992).

The United States Court of Military Appeals granted review of the issue, and specified the issue of whether the two charges were multiplicious for findings. The Court affirmed the decision of the Air Force Court of Military Review, stating that the military judge currently concluded on the basis of the record that the duty imposed by Captain Collins' order was not routine in nature, but was a specific mandate to perform a particular act at a definite time and place. *United States v. Traxler*, 39 M.J. at 476, 479 (C.M.A. 1994).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Charge II (disobeying a lawful command) should have been dismissed, since if an accused disobeys an order to do that which he already has a duty to do, his disobedience cannot be made a crime separate and more serious than his failure to perform his preexisting duty. *United States v. Bratcher*, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 125, 39 C.M.R. 125 (C.M.A. 1969). Appellant already had a duty to board the aircraft as imposed by the deployment order, thus Captain Collins' written order for him to board the aircraft was without legal effect.

The key to determining whether an order such as Captain Collins' is enforceable as a violation of Article 90 is a determination of what was the "ultimate offense" committed. *United States v. Peaches*, 25 M.J. 364, 365 (C.M.A. 1987). The concern is that the "giving of an order, and the subsequent disobedience of the same, not be permitted thereby to escalate the *punishment* to which an accused otherwise would be subject for the ultimate offense involved." *United States v. Quarles*, 1 M.J. 231, 232 (C.M.A. 1975) (emphasis in original).

Captain Collins' order served no purpose other than to reiterate the prior deployment order. It had no other practical effect. Further, in light of appellant's documented fear of flying, it was of no import whether or not appellant would board the aircraft. Appellant's only

purpose, as he saw it, was to preserve his safety by refusing to fly. He would have done so whether or not Captain Collins reiterated the existing order.

The "ultimate offense" in this case was the missing of a movement, not the violation of the order of a superior commissioned officer. "When the ultimate offense is found to be the underlying behavior as opposed to the willful disobedience of superior authority, the disobedience charge and specification are subject to dismissal." *United States v. Battle,* 27 M.J. 781, 783 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988), *citing United States v. Peaches,* 25 M.J. 364 (C.M.A. 1987). So should have been the ruling here.

In denying the appellant's motion to dismiss, the military judge specifically found that "[t]he duty imposed by the order was not routine in nature but was a specific mandate to perform a particular act at a definite time and place," and that the order was "not formulated for the purpose of enhancing the punitive consequences of a possible violation."

A violation of Article 87 by design provides for a maximum penalty of a dishonorable discharge, confinement for two years, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Commission of the offense of disobeying the order of a superior commissioned officer under Article 90 provides for a similar maximum punishment, except that the maximum confinement is five years.

The military judge's emphasis in his findings on the types of duties appellant would be performing once deployed were misplaced. The military judge did, however, acknowledge appellant's preexisting duty to board the deploying aircraft.

Because Congress set forth its intent in this regard, both charges cannot stand. Appellant still contends, as he did at trial, that the order was given for the purpose of enhancing the punishment when the appellant did not board the aircraft.

CONCLUSION

A clear understanding of what constitutes a lawful command, and when a command is given for improper purposes, is crucial for an understanding of the purpose and proper application of Article 90, U.C.M.J. Resolution of this case will have wide applicability throughout the military justice system.

Respectfully submitted,

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October 1994

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 93-0622
CMR No. 29311

UNITED STATES,

Appellee

v.

CHRIS E. TRAXLER, Technical Sergeant
U.S. Air Force,

Appellant.

Argued Jan. 6, 1994

Decided July 14, 1994

For Appellant: *Colonel Francis T. Lacey,* USAFR (argued); *Colonel Jay L. Cohen* and *Captain Ursula P. Moul* (on brief); *Terry J. Woodhouse.*

For Appellee: *Captain Jane L. Harless* (argued); *Colonel Jeffrey T. Infelise* (on brief).

Opinion of the Court

WISS, Judge:

Despite his not-guilty pleas, a general court-martial with members convicted Technical Sergeant Traxler of missing movement of an aircraft through design and willfully disobeying the command of his superior officer to board that same aircraft, in violation of Articles 87 and 90, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 887 and 890, respectively. The members sentenced Traxler

to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 1 year, reduction to the grade E-5, and a reprimand. The convening authority approved these results, and the Court of Military Review affirmed in an unpublished opinion.

On petition to this Court, we granted review of the first issue raised by appellate defense counsel and specified the second one, stated below as follows:

> WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGE II, DISOBEYING A LAWFUL COMMAND TO BOARD AN AIRCRAFT, WHEN THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE OF MISSING MOVEMENT WAS ALSO CHARGED.
>
> WHETHER CHARGE I [missing movement through design] IS MULTIPLICIOUS WITH CHARGE II.

We hold that Traxler properly was convicted both of missing movement through design and willfully disobeying his superior officer's order. We hold further that the two offenses are not multiplicious for findings, *see United States v. Teters,* 37 MJ 370 (CMA 1993), and that no notion of "ultimate offense" limits the maximum punishment just to that which is provided for missing movement.

I

A

Appellant, among others, received orders to board a certain aircraft for deployment to Europe on a Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise relating to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm; deployment was scheduled for December 15, 1990. In response, he told his first sergeant that he would not make the flight. He explained that he had a separation date in July 1991 and would go on terminal leave in April 1991. When the first sergeant retorted that his separation could be delayed, appellant offered additional explanations: He was going to start a business upon separation from the Air Force and, for a

variety of reasons, that could not be delayed; also, he had a fear of flying that had resulted from an incident on some earlier military flight.

On December 12, appellant spoke with his commander, Captain Collins, and gave similar reasons why he could not deploy. Collins answered that appellant's duty was to the Air Force and to obeying orders, not to some future civilian business; further, he recommended that appellant see the chief of the mental health clinic for counseling in connection with his fear of flying.

Anticipating that appellant might still balk at his deployment, Collins sought advice from the legal office and drafted a written direct order to board the aircraft. When, on December 15, Collins was called by the flightline supervisor and told that appellant refused to board, Collins went to the flightline with the written order in his pocket.

There, Collins spoke with appellant, and the latter said, "I can't go." When Collins asked why, appellant just said, "I can't go." At this point, Collins took appellant off to the side of the aircraft and told him he was going to read to him a written order and that he wanted appellant to sign its receipt to ensure his understanding of it. The order read: "I hereby give you a direct order to board Aircraft #63-7790 in conformance with your TDY orders (S.O. TF199 dated 12 Dec 90/31 TAW [Tactical Airlift Wing])." Appellant signed the receipt.

That done, security policemen escorted appellant away from the aircraft. Collins told appellant "that he had up until the time the actual door on the aircraft closed" to change his mind and board. Appellant did not, and so he missed the aircraft's movement.

B

At trial, Collins testified that, after he had referred appellant to the mental health clinic, personnel there reported to Collins that appellant did not have a legiti-

mate fear of flying; had he been told otherwise, Collins indicated that he "would not have" given his order. Collins insisted that, while he had sought advice from the legal office to deal with appellant's refusal, no discussion of punishment of appellant ever arose. Further, he maintained that "punishment was not on [his] mind" when he generated the order. Instead, he testified that the purpose of his order was "to indicate to [appellant] the seriousness of the deployment and that if he actually refused to deploy that he needed to think twice about that thought." He "put the written order together to emphasize the necessity of him to meet a deployment commitment." Collins' "hope was that [appellant] would board the aircraft and depart for Europe."

After entering findings of fact consistent with the foregoing discussion, the military judge announced the following pertinent conclusions as a predicate for denying a defense motion to dismiss the charge of disobeying Captain Collins' order.

> B. The duty imposed by the order was not routine in nature but was a specific mandate to perform a particular act at a definite time and place.
>
> C. The accused's violation of the order was a flagrant defiance of military authority in the presence of other military personnel and in the midst of a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed military exercise.
>
> D. Though the accused had a preexisting duty to board the deploying aircraft the order was formulated and issued by Capt. Collins with a view to adding the full authority of his position and rank to ensure the accused's compliance with the directive. It was not formulated for the purpose of enhancing the punitive consequences of a possible violation.
>
> E. Under current applicable decisions by both the Air Force Court of [Military] Review and Court of Military Appeals, the conduct of the accused on or

> about 15 December 1990 are [sic] properly charged as both violations of Article 87 and Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

After appellant had been convicted of both crimes, counsel and the military judge turned to the question of maximum punishment. Trial counsel indicated that, although the two offenses were separate, the Government would assume the "conservative approach" and "concede multiplicity" for sentencing "since they did in one sense arise out of the same act." Thus, pointing to the maximum punishment for willful disobedience of a superior officer's order, the prosecution urged that appellant's liability extended to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 5 years, total forfeitures, reduction to E-1, and a fine. *See* para. 14e(2), Part IV, and RCM 1003(b)(3) and (5), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984.

Defense counsel agreed with the rationale that the two offenses arose from the same act and, therefore, were multiplicious for sentence. However, he argued that "the underlying misconduct" was the act of missing movement and, therefore, that the confinement portion of the maximum punishment should be that which is provided for that offense—2 years. *See* para. 11e(1), Part IV, Manual, *supra.*

Ultimately, the military judge sided with the prosecution. He reasoned that his ruling on the defense motion as well as evidence subsequently adduced during the trial "arguably could make this a seven-year offense." However, since the Government had "conced[ed] multiplicity," he accepted trial counsel's position on the maximum punishment.

II

Appellant argues in this Court that he had a preexisting duty to board the aircraft for deployment and that, accordingly, his disobedience of Captain Collins' order to do what he already had a duty to do cannot be made a separate and more serious crime. In other words, he con-

tends, his "ultimate offense" was failure to deploy, not disobedience of Collins' order, and his punishment therefore is limited to the maximum punishment provided for missing movement by design. *See United States v. Peaches*, 25 MJ 364 (CMA 1987); *United States v. Bratcher*, 18 USCMA 125, 39 CMR 125, 1969 WL 5928 (1969); *see also United States v. Quarles*, 1 MJ 231 (CMA 1975).

Appellant's contention is accurate in general concept but is flawed in its imprecision. First, it is not simply the existence of a preexisting duty to do that which was the subject of the order that is material; rather, it is the nature of that preexisting duty. Generally, when the subject of an order from a superior officer amounts merely to performing routine soldierly duties, the order is no more than an admonition to obey the law and, thus, "can have no validity beyond the limit of the ultimate offense committed." *United States v. Bratcher, supra* at 128, 39 CMR at 128; *accord United States v. Peaches, supra* at 366. *Cf. United States v. Pettersen*, 17 MJ 69, 72 (CMA 1983) (where ascused had duty to return to base and perform duties but where accused had indicated intention not to do so, direct and personal order from noncommissioned officer to accompany him back to base "represented a measured attempt to secure compliance with those pre-existing obligations."); *United States v. Loos*, 4 USCMA 478, 480-81, 16 CMR 52, 54-55, 1954 WL 2427 (1954) ("a superior officer may, by supporting a routine duty with the full authority of his office, lift it above the common ruck—and thus remove the failure to perform it from within the ambit of Article 86(1)."). Here, though, the military judge correctly concluded on the basis of the record that "[t]he duty imposed by" Captain Collins' "order was not routine in nature but was a specific mandate to perform a particular act at a definite time and place." *See United States v. Bratcher, supra* at 128, 39 CMR at 128; para. 14c(2)(d), Part IV.

Second, appellant's contention ignores the materiality of the purpose of the order. "Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under" Article 90. Para. 14c(2)(a)(iii). Here, the military judge concluded—again, soundly based on the record—that Captain Collins' order "was not formulated for the purpose of enhancing the punitive consequences of a possible violation."

Rather, as the judge concluded, "the order was formulated and issued by Captain Collins with a view to adding the full authority of his position and rank to ensure the accused's compliance with the directive." *See United States v. Pettersen* and *United States v. Loos*, both *supra*. Captain Collins specifically testified, which is entirely consistent with his objective actions, that his purpose was to emphasize the necessity for appellant to deploy and to bring home to appellant the seriousness of his failure to do so—all in the hope that this would motivate appellant to board the aircraft.

Thus, Captain Collins' order was a "specific mandate" to do "a particular act at a definite time," as opposed to merely notifying appellant that he had a temporary duty scheduled; he delivered the order personally to appellant under circumstances that bore all the indicia of a formal command; and his purpose was to emphasize to appellant the importance of compliance with the earlier directive in the hope that appellant, therefore, would comply. In this posture, the military judge correctly ruled that appellant's willful disobedience of the order was an intentional defiance of the authority of Captain Collins' office and, in that connection, was distinct from his failure to comply with the earlier general directive to deploy. *See* para. 14c(2)(f).

III

The test for determining whether two offenses are multiplicious is "whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not," *Blockburger v. United States*, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). *Accord Schmuck v. United States*, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989); *United States v. Teters*, 37 MJ at 377. Appellant candidly acknowledges, "This analysis would seem to foreclose appellant's argument as to findings multiplicity. . . ." Final Brief at 6. *Compare* para. 11b *with* para. 14b(2), Part IV. We agree. In light of our analysis in Part II of this opinion regarding the relationship between missing movement of a unit that was required by a general order of a higher command and the particular direct order of appellant's superior commissioned officer in the circumstances of this case, the *Teters/Schmuck/Blockburger* test is not involved.

Through some reasoning that is not entirely clear, however, appellant argues nonetheless that, because "the order was given for the purpose of enhancing the punishment when the appellant did not board the aircraft," Final Brief at 7, this changes the result. We disagree. We already have upheld the military judge's conclusion, fully supported by the record, that Captain Collins did not have as a purpose enhancement of appellant's punishment if and when appellant did not board the aircraft; accordingly, the necessary predicate for this argument to succeed under our precedent is missing here. *See United States v. Landwehr*, 18 MJ 355, 356-57 (CMA 1984).

Finally, to the extent that this issue may be read to ask whether the two offenses are multiplicious for *sentencing*, the issue was mooted when the military judge accepted trial counsel's "conservative approach" of treating the offenses as multiplicious for sentencing. Appellant, however, both at trial and in this Court, has sought the windfall of a holding that, notwithstanding our conclusion in

Part II, his "ultimate offense" was missing movement, so his maximum confinement was only the 2 years provided for that offense, rather than the 5 years imposable for disobedience. *See* 39 MJ at 478.

That argument, too, is answered by our holding in Part II that Captain Collins' order under the scenario of this case imposed an independent duty on appellant to board the aircraft, apart from the earlier directive. *United States v. Landwehr, supra.* The purpose behind the "Note" in paragraph 16e(2), Part IV, Manual, *supra*—which limits the punishment for violating Article 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892, under similar circumstances to the lesser maximum punishment that is provided for the other offense—is fully served in the context of prosecutions under Articles 90 and 91, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890 and 891, by the approach in our precedent cases discussed in Part II. *See id.; United States v. Quarles,* 1 MJ at 232-33. Thus, our rejection in Part II of appellant's argument that is made under the principles of those cases answers this question, too.

IV

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Military Review is affirmed.

Chief Judge SULLIVAN and Judges COX, CRAWFORD, and GIERKE, concur.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT
OF MILITARY REVIEW

UNITED STATES

v.

Technical Sergeant CHRIS E. TRAXLER, FR374-60-1971
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ACM 29311

23 December 1992

Sentence adjudged 9 March 1991 by GCM convened at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. Military Judge: James J. Blommers.

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 1 year, reduction to E-5, and a reprimand.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Colonel Jeffrey R. Owens and Captain Ursula P. Moul.

Appelalte Counsel for the United States: Lieutenant Colonel Brenda J. Hollis, Major Paul H. Blackwell, Jr., and Captain Carlos L. McDade.

Before
O'HAIR, SNYDER, and GRUNICK
Appellate Military Judges

PER CURIAM:

Contrary to his pleas, appellant was convicted before court members of missing the movement of an aircraft

and failing to obey the order of an officer to board the deployment aircraft, in violation of Articles 87 and 90, UCMJ. The approved sentence included a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 1 year, reduction to E-5, and a reprimand. We have examined the two errors submitted by appellant and finding no error, we affirm.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ULTIMATE OFFENSE

During December 1990, appellant was tasked to deploy with others to Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany in support of a Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise. Appellant initially complained to his first sergeant that he could not deploy because of his pending terminal leave. He later expressed concern about the deployment's impact on a logging business he was attempting to start and finally declared he had a fear of flying. During the processing onto the deployment aircraft, appellant said he was not going to board. Appellant refused to board the appropriate aircraft even after being given a written order by his commander.

Appellant complains the ultimate offense was his missing the movement of the deploying aircraft and not the disobedience to his commander when ordered to board. He submits the Article 90 charge should have been dismissed by the military judge. We disagree with this assertion and find no error.

There is little doubt appellant's commander personally and directly issued an order that imposed a duty upon appellant over and beyond his routine duties. It is also clear from the record, appellant was defiant of this order and continued in his refusal to board the deployment aircraft. We have carefully considered the circumstances presented in the record and the commander's testimony of whether he was contemplating possible enhancement of punishment in the event of a violation of the order. It is clear from the record of trial, the order was issued by appellant's commander with a view to adding the full

authority of his position to ensure compliance with the order.

The commander testified he did not formulate the order for the purpose of enhancing the punishment. We agree with the determination by the military judge that the ultimate offense was the disobedience of the order from his commander to board the aircraft. Appellant's conduct was properly charged as violations of Article 87 and 90, UCMJ. *United States v. Peaches*, 25 M.J. 364 (C.M.A. 1987); *United States v. Battle*, 27 M.J. 781 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988).

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE

Appellant complains the military judge committed an error in failing to grant the defense challenge for cause during *voir dire* of one of the potential court members, Lt. Colonel Van Pelt. Trial defense counsel raised the challenge voicing concern that Lt. Colonel Van Pelt had prior knowledge of the case and was predisposed to adjudging a punitive discharge. Appellate defense counsel, for the first time, raise an additional concern that this potential court member was also the supervisor of one of the other potential members.

The challenged member overheard a conversation that someone refused to deploy because the person had a business downtown. Based upon a hypothetical question from trial defense counsel, Lt. Colonel Van Pelt responded that he might have "some concern" if he were on trial and a court member had overheard a conversation and possibly knew something more than what was to be presented at trial. He also candidly stated when he overheard the conversation, he thought, "that's not the type of people we need."

Trial defense counsel asked Lt. Colonel Van Pelt whether he would have any difficulty sitting as an impartial court member if what he heard was true. In response he said, "I don't think so, no." Trial counsel then asked:

Q. Col. Van Pelt, you indicated that you thought you could be impartial regardless of the information you had. Can you agree, sir, just to base your opinion, either on findings or on sentencing, only on what you hear in this courtroom and not on anything that might have occurred outside the courtroom?

A. Yes.

The military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the challenge against Lt. Colonel Van Pelt. There was no evidence at trial to show that Lt. Colonel Van Pelt had a predisposed opinion, lacked impartiality, or his relationship with another potential member would adversely impact on his serving. The challenge for cause against Lt. Colonel Van Pelt was properly denied. *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); *United States v. Murphy*, 26 M.J. 454 (C.M.A. 1988); *United States v. Smart*, 21 M.J. 15 (C.M.A. 1985).

CONCLUSIONS

The findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, the sentence is appropriate, and no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant was committed. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

[SEAL]

/s/ Naomi D. Allen
NAOMI D. ALLEN
TSgt, USAF
Chief Court Administrator, AFCMR

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